

THE IMPERIALISM OF THRASYBULUS

The achievement of Thrasybulus¹ on his last voyage has been variously estimated. Busolt² saw no more than a series of strong-arm acts that added up to very little. Beloch³ spoke of the Second Athenian Empire. For others there were mere renewals of friendship. This note has as its starting-point that Thrasybulus sought to restore the fifth-century empire.

If one looks merely at the list of places explicitly mentioned, the sum is not large. Thasos and its *peraea*, Samothrace and possibly its *peraea*, Byzantium, Chalcedon, Abydos possibly, Mytilene, Methymna, Eresus, Antissa, Chios, Halicarnassus, Aspendus.⁴ But Xenophon implies a great deal more. He remarked (4. 8. 26) that Thrasybulus thought that by reconciling the Thracian kings he would make the Greek cities along the sea-board (τὰς ὑπὸ τῇ Θράκῃ οἰκούσας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις) pay more heed to the Athenians, and it is clear from his account shortly afterwards (4. 8. 32 ff.) that when Iphicrates confronted Anaxibius on the Hellespont Athens was in a strong position, apparently in full control of the Chersonese while on the Asiatic shore a number of cities were campaigning against the Spartan bastion, Abydos. So in the Hellespontine area at least Thrasybulus' achievement was very considerable. Elsewhere one is less sure. The Lycian *corpus* chances to preserve a speech (27, *Against Ergocles*) with allusion to intervention in Halicarnassus. Xenophon alludes to collection of money (ἡργυρολόγει 4. 8. 30) from 'other cities' as well as from Aspendus, and there is no way of knowing how many: since Thrasybulus was in a hurry, perhaps only a few. But it is tell-tale that intervention in Lesbos resulted in a naval contingent joining his fleet, and even more so that without intervention Chios followed suit. Both by his actions and merely at his approach alliances flourished.

But was this empire? One must note that nowhere is there any suggestion of the delays which the formal making of alliances would have required: alliances, existing but dormant, were being revived, and these can have been none other than the alliances of the empire.⁵ Further, the financial institutions of Thrasybulus, viz. the tithe on the Pontic traffic (Xen. 4. 8. 27; Dem. 20. 60) and the 5-per-cent tax (*IG* ii² 24; Tod, *GHI* 114) imply imperial control of the seas and imperial control of the allied cities. It would be perverse to regard Thrasybulus as other than a full-blooded would-be restorer of the fifth-century empire.⁶

I wish to thank Mr. David Thomas of Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for helpful criticism of this paper.

¹ Two important articles concerning Thrasybulus have appeared in recent years—R. Seager, 'Thrasybulus, Conon, and Athenian Imperialism 396–386 B.C.' *JHS* 87 (1967), 95–115 is a major contribution on which this note draws so extensively that explicit reference will be made only on points crucial to the argument, and S. Perlman, 'Athenian democracy and the revival of imperialistic expansion at the beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.' *CPh* 63 (1968), 257–67, to which this note offers a modification.

All references are to Xenophon, *Hellenica*,

unless otherwise stated.

² Busolt, *Der zweite athenische Bund*, 675 f.

³ Beloch, *GG* iii². 1. 150 n. 2.

⁴ 4. 8. 26–30; 5. 1. 7; Diod. 14. 94 and 99. 4 f.; Dem. 20. 59, 60; Lys. 28. 12 and 17. For Abydos, Dem. 57. 38, but the Thrasybulus there referred to is more probably not the Stirian, cf. 5. 1. 26 f.

⁵ Cf. the phrase of the inscription set up in honour of Conon (Dem. 20. 69). The στήλαι ἀνεπιτήδευτοι of the fifth century had to be destroyed in 377 (Tod. *GHI* 123, l. 34).

⁶ Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia*, 147 speaks of Thrasybulus' 'programma politico, di un impero ateniese rispettoso dei diritti delle singole poleis'. He

Nor did his death mark a change of policy.⁷ As the Clazomenae decree of 387/6 (Tod, *GHI* 114) shows, 5-per-cent tax continued and the import of corn to the cities was under Athens' control; there could even be question of a garrison and an *archon*. So Agyrrhius undid nothing and had, in principle, nothing more to do.⁸ Thrasybulus, the imperialist, was not deposed for excess or defect of imperialism. The explanations of the recall of the generals must lie elsewhere. Thrasybulus had been sent out to help the Rhodian *demos* (Xen. 4. 8. 25 τῆς εἰς Ῥόδον βοηθείας)⁹ with forty new ships, and had lost twenty-three of them in a storm (Diod. 14. 94. 3), while Rhodes had been taken over by the party hostile to Athens.¹⁰ All this suffices to explain why the Athenians turned against Thrasybulus. There was no crisis of imperial policy.

All this has recently been adequately remarked. But it raises the question of the difference between Conon and Thrasybulus. Both were imperialists. Why then do they see-saw in popular favour?

Questions of chronology cannot be shirked. On the conventional view there is a hiatus between the departure of Conon to Sardis (4. 8. 13) and the re-emergence of Thrasybulus. Beloch took a mention of the name in the *Plutus* (550) as a sign that Thrasybulus was still alive in 389/8, and put the voyage in that year,¹¹ in which case one has to explain what Thrasybulus had been doing in the interim. But Aristophanes may be referring to Thrasybulus of Collytus, and Beloch's whole argument is unsound. Seager¹² has roundly refuted this, but without explicit argument places the voyage of Thrasybulus the Stirian in 390/89, which leaves quite a long gap in which Sparta was left to her own devices. Is this date correct?

After the peace negotiations of 392/1¹³ the Spartans resumed hostilities in the

cites no evidence, but from 'Il problema della nazionalità greca nella politica di Pericle e di Trasibulo', *Paideia* 11 (1956), 250, it emerges that he is basing himself on the terms of the Eretrian alliance of 394 (Tod, *GHI* 103, and cf. Cloché, *REA* 21, 1919, 167), as if what happened in the early days of the Grand Alliance were at all relevant to the mood of 391 after the diplomatic experience of 392/1.

⁷ Cf. Perlman, art. cit., 266, and Cloché, art. cit., 187.

⁸ It is notable that Xenophon names Agyrrhius once only (4. 8. 31), but that is merely a reflection of the sketchy nature of the account of the naval war. His deme was Collytus which thus was doubly represented by him and Thrasybulus of Collytus. Presumably Agyrrhius was the 'senior man'. His policies perhaps accorded with those of his nephew, Callistratus (Dem. 24. 135), both financially and in foreign affairs (Philoch. F. 149). (For his career, see J.K. Davies, *Ath. Prop. Fam.*, 278.) His long imprisonment reflects the discredit into which he fell, after the King's Peace was produced by his imperialist activities (*v.i.*).

⁹ Cf. esp. Seager, art. cit., 109.

¹⁰ Cf. Diod. 14. 99. 5 and 5. 1. 5. Lysias 28. 1 speaks of the betrayal of cities, and while this may refer to no more than Hali-carnassus (cf. § 17), the cities of Rhodes also may be in mind.

¹¹ *GG* iii². 2. 224. For the nauarchies, cf. below, n. 14.

¹² Cf. Seager, art. cit., 109, n. 127.

¹³ The date of the negotiations at Sparta is sure, both from the references in Andocides 3 (the Boeotians have fought for four years, § 20, the war having begun in 395/4, and Sparta has captured Lechaem, § 18, the event of early 392 described by Xenophon, 3. 4. 1 ff.) and from the archon date given by Philochorus, F. 149 (see below, note 25 for Bruce's mishandling of this passage, but he does not challenge the dating). Conon's recall and the congress at Sardis (4. 8. 12 f.) may fall in the first half of 392, not long after the capture of Lechaem (cf. *PW* vi. 1 col. 1052 s.v. 'Eukleios' for probable dating of the Eucleia early in the Julian year). This would allow enough time for him to alarm the Spartans (4. 8. 12) and to send off the embassy to Syracuse, which checked the dis-

summer of 391 with an attack on the Argolid by Agesilaus, followed immediately by a combined assault on Corinth, Agesilaus seizing the newly rebuilt Long Walls and Teleutias with a naval force of about 12 ships capturing the ships and the docks of the Lechaëum (4. 4. 19). Since Agesilaus ravaged widely in the Argolid (4. 4. 19; 4. 7. 5), the date of his campaign is likely to have been early summer when the corn was ripe. At this time Teleutias was probably nauarch. The only fleet Sparta had at sea in 392/1 was the fleet in the Corinthian Gulf. Podanemus had commanded it as nauarch in 393/2, and, when in the course of his year of office he was killed, Pollis the epistoleus took over and being wounded was replaced by Herippidas, presumably for the remainder of the year. Teleutias then 'came to the ships of Herippidas' before the abortive peace negotiations of 392/1 (4. 8. 11, 12), and presumably as nauarch;¹⁴ for where else at

patch of a Syracusan fleet in spring 392 (Lys. 19. 19 f.), and as much time as possible for the Congress of Sparta, which was in two stages, forty days apart (Andoc. 3. 33, 40). There is, however, no need to postulate a long delay between the Congress of Sardis and the Congress of Sparta, for, as Barbieri, *Conone*, 179, argued, the Persian share of the second was probably due to Tiribazus, who was later tried for his presumption (Diod. 15. 10). He perhaps issued a rescript in the name of the King (cf. Andoc. 3. 14 οὔτε βασιλεὺς and Philoch. F. 149) before 'going up' to see him (4. 8. 16), and about six months before Strouthas appeared in Ionia to resume the war (4. 8. 17).

This note presumes that Sparta followed Sardis (*pace* Momigliano, *Ann. Sc. Norm. Sup. Pisa* 2nd Ser. v, 1936). The reason why Andocides does not deal explicitly with the question of the status of the Greeks of Asia in the proposed peace-terms is that, when he was speaking, their abandonment to the King was still the axiom, albeit uneasy, of Athenian policy, and it was not until Callistratus attacked the ambassadors on this very issue (Philoch. F. 149) that the new policy was, in the manner characteristic of Athenian political life, proclaimed: after their condemnation negotiations of the sort conducted at Sardis were not conceivable. Further, *pace* Bruce (below, note 25), Philochorus makes it certain that the peace proposed at Sparta was a Royal peace, and to suppose that at Sparta Athens' claim to Lemnos etc. was conceded (Andoc. 3. 14), then at Sardis retracted, and then in 387/6, when Athens was at the King's mercy (5. 1. 28), again conceded, makes a senseless progression. Cf. Seager, art. cit., 105, n. 92. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, Appendix XII, discusses the chronology of these years: on p. 31 he envisages that the Congress of Sparta may have followed the arrival of Strouthas in Ionia, because he rejects the evidence of Philochorus, a perilous procedure

for the fourth century.

¹⁴ The nauarchy could be held once only (2. 1. 7). The only exception commonly admitted is Pollis, nauarch in 396/5 according to *Hell. Oxy.* 19. 1 and in 376 at the battle of Naxos (5. 4. 61), but proof is wanting that it was the same man on each occasion. Certainly Teleutias is unlikely to have been nauarch in 387, despite the doubtful text of 5. 1. 13; Antalcidas was nauarch in 388/7 (5. 1. 6) and was back from the King in time to blockade the corn ships coming from the Pontus (5. 1. 28), i.e. in autumn (cf. Dem. 50. 4, 19), but Teleutias had by then come to the ships on Aegina (5. 1. 13; cf. his allusions to Antalcidas' quest for money in the speech he delivered to the fleet, §§ 14–17). So there is no obstacle there to his being nauarch in 392/1.

Xenophon names no one nauarch between Ecdicus, 391/0 (4. 8. 20), and Hierax, the immediate predecessor of Antalcidas (5. 1. 3, 5 f.), therefore 389/8. Who was nauarch in 390/89? Teleutias was operating in that year in command of the fleet (5. 1. 3) but, for the reason given above, not as nauarch. Can it have been the mysterious Chilon, the nauarch of Aesch. 2. 78, against whom Demaenetus fought a sea battle? Ed. Meyer, *Theopomps Hellenica*, 42, jumped to the presumption that Aeschines was really talking about Milon, the harmost on Aegina, who pursued Demaenetus in *Hell. Oxy.* 6 and 8. But that is wanton. Aeschines' use of the word, *συγκατεναυμάχησε* implies both more than the skirmish of *Hell. Oxy.* 8 and more than a single ship. Further, Chilon is a well-known Spartan name, a bearer of which is to be met at 7. 4. 23. There is no justification for changing the name in Aeschines and scrapping the office assigned. Demaenetus was a general in 388/7 (5. 1. 10) and could have been, for all we know, previously, and the sea-battle in which he shared in defeating the nauarch could have been part of the

that moment could the nauarch be? By the time his nauarchy ended in autumn 391, the scene had shifted to the east Aegean and his successor as nauarch, Ecdicus, was assigned the task of saving Rhodes (4. 8. 20 f.) probably as soon as he took office. Thibron's last campaign was probably short, to judge by the short range of his ravaging (4. 8. 17, Diod. 14. 99), and his death probably fell in later summer 391; Sparta must have sent his replacement, Diphridas, who went out with Ecdicus (4. 8. 21), at no great interval; so Ecdicus probably sailed east in autumn 391. He was replaced by Teleutias, who 'sailed round' with 'the twelve ships'—i.e. the ships of the raid on the Lechaëum of summer 391 (4. 8. 23 and 4. 4. 19). When was this replacement? Ecdicus found that his eight ships were insufficient to face a Rhodian *demos* controlling the seas with twice that number (4. 8. 22), and he must have found out the facts of the situation fairly quickly. So it is likely that his appeal for help came in latish 391 and, since Sparta could hardly leave Ecdicus unreinforced any longer than absolutely necessary, nor for that matter her allies on Rhodes unsupported, Teleutias would have been sent in late 391. (For in time of crisis fleets could sail late in the year. In 352 it was proposed to send 40 ships to the Hellespont in November,¹⁵ and evidently in 361 a naval force came out from Athens to Thasos very late.¹⁶ So there is nothing preposterous in having Teleutias sail east in late 391.)

When then was Thrasybulus sent out? In the narrative of Xenophon he went out after Teleutias had arrived in Rhodes (4. 8. 25) and if that is correct his voyage may well have begun in the course of 390. But there is some reason to put it too into late 391. First, the appeal to Sparta and the dispatch of Ecdicus with eight ships (4. 8. 20) is not likely to have remained a secret in Rhodes for very long, and a counter appeal to Athens would naturally enough have followed. But even if the Rhodian democrats decided that Ecdicus' few ships were nothing to worry about, the arrival of Teleutias with thirty-seven ships (4. 8. 24), if they had not appealed to Athens earlier, must have stirred them promptly to appeal, for fear of naval blockade of their new city of Rhodes. So an appeal in 391 is probable enough. Secondly, Thrasybulus was sent out to help Rhodes (cf. τῆς εἰς Ῥόδον βοήθειας 4. 8. 25). Why did he decide not to do so? Presumably the situation had changed since the decision of the Athenian assembly, and, although the events of the war on Rhodes are so little attested, one inevitably suspects that for Thrasybulus the new factor in the situation was the arrival of Teleutias which made it difficult to get at the Laconizers in their fortress. So it may well be that Thrasybulus went out at much the same time as Teleutias sailed round and the news of the latter's presence gave Thrasybulus the excuse to be on with other matters. Thirdly, there is much to be said for placing Thrasybulus' work in the Hellespontine region in a winter. If Teleutias was in Rhodes with twenty-seven ships, having captured ten Athenian ships as well, Thrasybulus had a prime duty to prevent a further build-up of naval power off Rhodes, and his leaving Rhodes suggests that he expected no reinforcements to be sent out to Teleutias. Again, he would have felt bound to seek to engage the Spartan fleet in battle, if he possibly could: that he felt free to neglect it suggests the lull in operations of winter. So one must choose between winter 391/0 and winter 390/89, and, if Teleutias did

operations Xenophon does not notice (see below). So Chilon may well be the missing name.

There is a convenient table of the evidence for Spartan commands in the Corinthian

War in L. Pareti, *Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani*, 157 f. Franke, *PW* xvi. 2, col. 1890 f., refers to the main discussions.

¹⁵ Dem. 3. 4.

¹⁶ Dem. 50. 29.

go out in 391, a whole year is too long an interval. 391 is the year for Thrasybulus to leave Athens.

There are two objections to this chronology. First, Hierax, nauarch of 389/8, took over Teleutias' navy in Aegina (5. 1. 3), presumably in autumn 389, and if Teleutias went out in 391 he must have remained in command of the Spartan navy for almost two whole years after his nauarchy of 392/1, i.e. the major part of Ecdicus' year and 390/89. But Teleutias was very popular in the fleet in this period (cf. his departure at 5. 1. 3 and his return at 5. 1. 13) and perhaps too at home, where his step-brother, Agesilaus, could laud his success in Rhodes. So a long command is not surprising. His position in 391/0 was odd anyway and a second year without a nauarch appearing in Xenophon's narrative is perhaps equally to be explained in terms of Agesilaus' influence. Nor need one deny Teleutias a second year of extraordinary command because one hears of nothing of what he was engaged on during it. Of two of the centres of the naval war, Aegina and the Hellespont, Xenophon gives only the most sketchy information for the period after the death of Thrasybulus down to the King's Peace, and of the other centre, Rhodes, to which Hierax addressed himself in 389/8, he says practically nothing. But no doubt the war went on there and provided Teleutias with useful employment.

The second objection concerns Evagoras. Xenophon (4. 8. 24) remarked on the paradox of Teleutias on his way to Rhodes capturing ten Athenian ships bound for Evagoras, who was at war with the Great King. The Cyprian war was yet another 'ten-year war', so favoured of the Greeks: in Isocrates (9. 64) it was '10 years', in the Ephoran tradition it was 'about ten years' (Diod. 15. 9. 2). Since it was still in progress, though nearing its end, in 380 (Isoc. 4. 135, 141), an exact calculation of ten years would suggest that the Athenians sent the ships in 390 at the earliest. But exact insistence on ten years is out of place, and the war may well have begun in 391/0.¹⁷ Furthermore, one should be cautious about Xenophon's paradox. The warlike ambitions of Evagoras took some time to break out in open hostility to the Great King (Diod. 14. 98), and the ten ships called for under the recent alliance with Athens may have been for the preliminary operations¹⁸ but thought of by Xenophon as part of the war against Persia.¹⁹ So it is not necessarily the case that the ten ships were sent out no earlier than 390.

The hypothesis is therefore advanced that Thrasybulus' voyage began not in 390 or later, but in 391 within six months of the resumption of hostilities. If it is correct, it has the advantage of getting rid of the awkward hiatus between the resumption of hostilities in Greece on Sparta's part and any sort of action on the part of Athens. If the war resumed in May/June 391, Athens' first action will

¹⁷ The chronology of the war is discussed by Beloch, *GG* iii². 2. 226 ff. Cf. K. Spyridakis, *Evagoras I von Salamis*, 54 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. Lys. 19. 21. The ambassadors, who requested help from Athens, hired peltasts and bought arms. Perhaps these were for the preliminary land operations on Cyprus.

¹⁹ If Theopompus (F. 103) is to be trusted, the Great King took no action against Evagoras until Autophradates was satrap of Lydia, who was appointed with Hecatomnus (for whom cf. Diod. 14. 98. 3) to conduct the

war against Evagoras. Presumably Autophradates succeeded Strouthas (*pace* Tod, *GHI* 113, which makes him satrap of Ionia), and, unless Strouthas had a very short period as satrap, the order to Autophradates and Hecatomnus must have been later. The date of Tiribazus' return to Ionia (5. 1. 28) is quite unsure, but, since it probably betokened a change of mood in Susa, was probably not long before Antalcidas went out as nauarch to seek the help of Persia.

have been to decree the building of a fleet,²⁰ which happened to be ready when the moment came for Thrasybulus to be sent to Rhodes but which had been ordered for another more general purpose. How long it took to build these ships is a matter of conjecture, but the five months or so the hypothesis just advanced allows seems about right. Thus while Sparta resumed operations in the northern Peloponnese, and then sent Thibron out to Asia to take up where Agesilaus had been forced three years before to leave off,²¹ Athens prepared to make a bold bid with her navy.

That Thrasybulus was the chief inspiration of this policy is nowhere stated, but may perhaps be guessed from Lysias' speech *Against Ergocles*. At §4 the speaker declares 'I think you could all agree that, if Thrasybulus had been promising you that he would sail out with triremes and return them as old ships in place of new . . ., none of you would have allowed him to sail out with the ships . . .' This suggests that Thrasybulus had promised something, and that that something had been more general than the narrow end of supporting the Rhodian *demos*. Later, at §14, the speaker says 'You entrusted yourselves to these men (i.e. Thrasybulus, Ergocles, etc.) in order that they might make the city powerful and free'. So perhaps it is not wildly astray to suppose that when the peace negotiations came to nothing Thrasybulus proposed the building of a fleet and a plan to make the city powerful and free, i.e. to restore the empire; before the fleet was ready, the call from Rhodes came, and Thrasybulus went out on a mission which he was happy to neglect while he pursued his original aim. But this is all conjecture. The important question, to which a more solid answer is here sought, concerns Thrasybulus and Conon. In what did they differ?

Before the peace negotiations of 392/1 Thrasybulus was clearly the man responsible for the Boeotian alliance. Not only did he propose the decree (3. 5. 16) but also it was he who led the Athenian contingent to Haliartus (Plut. *Lys.* 29. 1) and later to Nemea (Lys. 16. 15). Earlier however, as the Oxyrhynchus historian describes (ch. 6), Thrasybulus had opposed a move to help Conon's preparations, and it is not satisfactory to ascribe his opposition merely to a cautious feeling that the time was not ripe for bold steps. First of all, the Theban alliance, as Thrasybulus declared in his speech (3. 5. 16), was indeed a hazardous affair: the Peiraeus was without walls, and unless the Thebans succeeded (which they might well not have done had Pausanias kept his rendezvous with Lysander) Athens would be as much at Sparta's mercy as she could possibly be. Also war was inevitable, once the alliance was made. Although we tend, under the influence of Xenophon, to speak of the Theban alliance, it was, as the stone recording it shows (Tod, *GHI* 101), an alliance with Boeotia and at the moment it was made Lysander was already on Boeotian territory at Orchomenus (3. 5. 6, 17). So the alliance was in no sense precautionary. It plainly meant war, a bold step indeed. The man whose action in sending a ship to Conon Thrasybulus had opposed, Demaenetus, had been seeking to have Persia and the Persian navy fight Athens' war of liberation for her. No such caution could be claimed in the alliance with Thebes. Secondly, that there was a real difference in policy between Conon and Thrasybulus is strongly suggested by the eclipse of the latter by the former and

²⁰ It is to be suspected that the ten ships that were sent to Cyprus (4. 8. 24) were not new ships, but the remnants of the fifth-century navy, which Athens had been allowed to keep.

²¹ Cf. the size of Thibron's army, Diod. 14. 99. 2, which equalled that of Agesilaus (3. 4. 2, Diod. 14. 79. 1 f.).

his supporters once the battle of Cnidus had been fought and won until the collapse of the negotiations of 392/1 (cf. Ar. *Eccl.* 193–203). If it had been the case that Thrasybulus had been prepared to venture on the Theban alliance 'only after Conon's first success in the Aegean, after the democratic revolution had taken place in Rhodes',²² the success of the one should not so completely have displaced the other. Thrasybulus' policy cannot have been so much ancillary as alternative to that of his opponents.²³

The explanation here proposed is that the issue between the two concerned relations with Persia. Both were resolved to restore Athens' imperial power, but their methods differed. Thrasybulus proceeded in 391/0 with his plans regardless of Persian feelings. Conon was more circumspect. Outwardly he was the liberator, as the inscription on his statue showed (Dem. 20. 69); clandestinely he was doing all he could to restore Athenian power, as the Spartan denunciation of him at Sardis suggested (4. 8. 12; Nepos, *Con.* 5. 2). His actions were defensible enough for him to answer the summons of Tiribazus and suspect enough for him to be put into prison (Il. c.; Diod. 14. 85. 4). But Conon continued to believe in the necessity of the Persian friendship, and he remained a Persian admiral; Tiribazus recalled him to Sardis under the pretence that he wished to send him up to the Great King on business (Nep. *Con.* 5. 3). Conon obeyed.

The differing attitudes are illuminated by the differing responses to the summons to a Persian-dictated peace. When Conon went to Sardis, he was accompanied by four Athenian ambassadors to what was essentially a peace congress, and although one can hardly determine Conon's attitude merely by his not having opposed the city sending ambassadors, the role of his associate, Epicrates, in the consequent congress at Sparta does show that the opponents of Thrasybulus were prepared to accept the limitations of a King's Peace. Epicrates, who with Cephalus had been responsible for the clandestine help for Conon when he was assembling his fleet (*Hell. Oxy.* 7. 2), had already shared with Phormisios an embassy to Persia²⁴ and the fact that they were accused of accepting bribes during it from the Great King shows that they were working for concord between Athens and Persia (Plato, fr. 119, K. 1. 633). Similarly, Epicrates and Cephalus were credited with accepting money from Timocrates in 395 (*Hell. Oxy.* 7. 2), again a sign of their policy. So it is no surprise that Epicrates was one of the four ambassadors exiled for being ready to assent to a King's Peace in 392–1 (Philoch. F. 149).²⁵

²² Perlman, art. cit., 261.

²³ As Seager pointed out, art. cit., 98 f., there seems to have been considerable disillusionment by late 394 with the policy of Thrasybulus, but his share in the creation of the Grand Alliance, which safeguarded Athens against Spartan invasion, was much to his credit. His eclipse requires fuller explanation.

²⁴ Cf. J. K. Davies, *Ath. Prop. Fam.*, 181.

²⁵ I. A. F. Bruce, 'Athenian Embassies in the Early Fourth Century B.C.' *Historia* 15 (1966), rejects Philochorus F. 149 in favour of Aristides, *Panath.* 172. 10 ff. (with Scholiast) and supposes that Epicrates was tried for his part in the embassy which made the King's Peace in 387/6. Assuming that the four ambassadors of Philochorus were together on some occasion, one may assert

confidently enough that it was not in 387/6. Callias in his speech at the congress before Leuctra (6. 3. 4) asserted that he had on two previous occasions been on embassies to Sparta which had succeeded in making a peace: the probable occasions are 375 and 387/6; 404 is possible, if Callias was indeed born in the middle of the fifth century (Davies, *Ath. Prop. Fam.*, 263), but the manner in which he alludes to his peace-making missions (6. 3. 4) hardly suits a 33-year interval (and since his own generalships, to which he refers, included that of 4. 5. 13 and Philoch. F. 150, he has in mind the period of the King's Peace). In any case, to reject Philochorus in favour of Aristides is a wholly unsatisfactory procedure (cf. Jacoby, *FGH* iii b. 1. 227 f. and 230 f. for the standing of Philochorus), nor is it likely that Didymus

By contrast, Thrasybulus, if Seager is right in his interpretation of line 356 of the *Ecclesiazusae*,²⁶ opposed the peace. He was opposed, that is, to accepting the limitations of Persian peace. In defending submission to the peace Andocides (3. 13 ff.) had argued that Athens had no good reason for fighting on, and concluded by dismissing the idea of recovering the assets of the fifth-century empire. 'Well, it might be suggested, we should fight on to get back the Chersonese, and the colonies, and our holdings (ἐγκτήματα) and investments (χρέα). But neither the Great King nor our allies agree with us with whose help we must fight to get them.' It was this very idea which moved Thrasybulus first to oppose the peace, and shortly after to demand the fleet to realize it.

After the exiling of Epicrates, no more is heard of his partner of 396 and 395, Cephālus (see above), until after the King's Peace he re-emerges, first as critic of the discredited board of generals headed by Agyrrhius (Tod, *GHI* 116), then as architect of policy in the formation of the Chian alliance (ibid. 118, line 40) and of the aid to Thebes at the Liberation (Din. 1. 38). Agyrrhius and his fellow generals, who had carried on the imperialist plans of Thrasybulus, had, by contrast, to bear the blame for the new concord between Sparta and Persia, and prosecutions followed.²⁷ In the long run the prudence of Conon had showed itself right. Athenian imperialist hopes continued to thrive, but never again will the city dare the Great King's displeasure, save momentarily during the Social War when repentance swiftly followed.²⁸ When the Chian alliance is made in 384, the sanctity of the King's Peace is carefully spelled out (Tod, *GHI* 118 l. 9). The folly of Thrasybulus will not be repeated.

The attitude of Xenophon to Thrasybulus may in part reflect this antipathy to concord of any sort with Persia. According to the Oxyrhynchus historian (7. 2), Epicrates and Cephalus received money from the envoy Timocrates, a tradition which emerges perhaps in Pausanias (3. 9. 7). Xenophon (3. 5. 2) exempts Athens from this charge, and the explanation may be advanced that, because this was the period when Thrasybulus was influential and Athens entered the war by way of the Theban alliance of which Thrasybulus was the architect, no suspicion of Persian gold could fall on Athens. Thrasybulus could least of all be suspect of such medism. When his death was recorded, he received final commendation (4. 8. 31). No one who had had any share in using Persia to destroy Spartan power in Greece could have had that from Xenophon.

University College, Oxford

G. L. CAWKWELL

in quoting at length as he does for F. 149 turned up the wrong archon. Philochorus referred to the peace of 392/1 not just as the Peace of Antalcidas but as τὴν εἰρήνην τὴν ἐπ' Ἀντιαλκίδου . . . ἣν Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐδέξαντο—a just designation if 392/1 was

essentially the King's Peace *manqué*.

²⁶ Art. cit., 107 f.

²⁷ 5. 1. 26; Dem. 19. 180 and 24. 134; Lys. 19. 50. and 26. 23.

²⁸ Cf. Diod. 16. 22 etc.